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Late last year the DOJ won their long running antitrust case vs Google when Judge Mehta ruled in their favor declaring unequivocally that “Google is a monopolist, and it has acted as one to maintain its monopoly”. Last week the remedies part of the trial started. Among the numerous remedies that the DOJ is asking for, is an effective total ban on revenue sharing deals between Google and browser vendors.
One obvious concern with cancelling these deals is that this will bankrupt Mozilla, the maker of the Firefox browser and the Gecko browser engine, who is heavily reliant on their search deal with Google. This was directly acknowledged by the court:
THE COURT: So I mean, it seems to me Mozilla, in some sense, would have a more compelling argument than you because it's not like Apple is going to go out of business if I don't -- you know, if you can no longer get revenue share. You've got other sources of revenue; Mozilla hardly has any. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs GOOGLE LLC
Google has agreements with several browser vendors to set Google as the default search engine for users who have not previously made a manual choice. In return, Google shares a portion of the revenue it earns from searches performed through those browsers. Google is estimated to pay Mozilla approximately $410-420 million per year.
During the case, evidence showed that Mozilla reinvested the vast majority of its Google search revenue into Firefox and Gecko. However, its market share, under 3%, was deemed too small to deliver a significant public benefit.
This reasoning is flawed. If Mozilla’s market share is considered negligible, then given that searches via Firefox makes up less than 1.15% of the U.S. search market, it should also be seen as insignificant in the broader context. It is inconsistent to argue that one metric matters while dismissing the other.
Further, given that an estimated 35% of users would manually switch back to Google, this suggests that Google will only lose less than a mere .75% market share from being blocked from signing a search engine default deal with Mozilla.
Mozilla plays a uniquely valuable role in the internet ecosystem as a non-profit committed to an open, secure, and user-centric internet. Despite its modest market share, Mozilla has a large influence on web standards, holding equal footing with Google and Apple in governance bodies like the W3C TAG. Mozilla also maintains its own independent engine, Gecko, which ensures diversity in browser implementations. Gecko is one of only three engines left in major usage. Mozilla frequently serves as a crucial third implementor voice in standards discussions, offering a non-profit perspective grounded in the public interest. Removing Mozilla from this equation would do far more harm to the long-term health of the web than any marginal competitive benefit from eliminating its Google deal, especially when other remedies could already push Google’s search engine market share below 50% and the drop in Google’s share from this remedy is so negligible.
Other Sources of Revenue?
One might reasonably ask: couldn’t Mozilla simply sign a deal with another search engine, such as Bing or DuckDuckGo? It’s a fair question and worth examining closely.
During the U.S. v. Google case, evidence showed that both Bing and DuckDuckGo had repeatedly attempted to strike default search deals with Apple. Both failed. Neither could match the immense sums Google was offering, currently an estimated $20 billion annually. Bing came closest, offering approximately $4 billion per year at an unsustainable 90% revenue share rate. By contrast, Google reportedly pays Apple just 36% of search revenue.
It’s important to understand the scale at play: over half of all U.S. search queries pass through Apple devices, with roughly 67% of those influenced by Apple’s default search deal. In comparison, Mozilla accounts for less than 1.15% of U.S. search queries.
over half of all search volume in the United States flows through Apple devices
Memorandum Opinion - United States of America vs Google LLC
Given these dynamics, it is unlikely Microsoft would engage in a major bidding war to secure a deal with Mozilla, especially without Google driving prices up. Crucially, the bargaining power would lie with Microsoft, not Mozilla. After all, Microsoft and Bing are at no risk of bankruptcy were a deal to fall through.
One way to estimate the potential value of a Microsoft-Mozilla search deal is by looking at the ratio of market shares. Microsoft was willing to pay around $4 billion per year to be the default search engine for approximately 33.5% of the U.S. search market (68% impacted by Apple deal × 50% Apple Devices U.S. Search Share). Applying the same ratio, Mozilla’s less than 1.15% share would translate to roughly $130 million per year (4000 ÷ 33.5 × 1.15).
However, even this figure likely overstates the real value. It's highly improbable that Microsoft would offer Mozilla a 90% revenue share, they offered Apple. A more realistic offer would likely resemble the 36% rate that Google agreed upon with Apple.
Finally this 1.15% figure includes all small browsers, not just Mozilla.
Taking that into account, any search deal Microsoft might offer Mozilla would realistically fall between $40 million and $130 million per year, with the upper bound being unlikely. A more plausible figure would be closer to $40 million annually.
Could Mozilla Simply Spend Less?
Some have argued that Mozilla’s current budget could serve as a baseline for reasonable investment in the web platform. This view is fundamentally flawed.
Firefox is a shrinking browser, struggling to maintain its market share. To thrive, not merely survive, Mozilla needs significantly more funding than it currently receives. Treating its already constrained budget as a benchmark ignores the reality that Firefox is not operating from a position of strength.
Unlike smaller Chromium-based browsers that can rely heavily on Google’s ongoing investment, Mozilla must independently fund and develop both its browser and its engine, Gecko. This independence is both a strength and a burden, requiring substantial ongoing investment to keep pace with evolving web standards and competitive features.
Although Mozilla has strong financial reserves today, losing even three-quarters, or worse, nine-tenths, of its current revenue would be devastating. At a minimum, it would almost certainly cancel its Gecko port to iOS, and force mass layoffs among its browser engineering teams.
While Mozilla might avoid outright bankruptcy, it would quickly fade into irrelevance. Without sufficient ongoing development, Gecko would likely follow the fate of other abandoned browser engines like Trident, EdgeHTML, and Presto.
What Is the Alternative?
We propose that smaller browsers, such as Mozilla, be allowed to sell 100% of their default search placement to Google. This carve-out is justified because, while these smaller browsers account for only a minor share of search traffic, they play a vital role in sustaining browser competition and in governing the open web. A healthy browser market depends on preserving these potential future challengers.
Two potential concerns might be raised:
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Growth scenario: A smaller browser, such as Firefox, Opera, Vivaldi, or Samsung Internet, could significantly grow in market share over 5–10 years, reaching 20–40% of the browser market. While such growth is highly desirable from a competition standpoint, it could become problematic if Google continued paying for 100% of the default search placement at that scale.
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Aggregate deals scenario: Google might strike numerous deals with smaller browsers, which in aggregate could exceed the 50% market share cap.
Both scenarios are solvable and, in our view, unlikely.
For the first case, the 50% cap could be applied progressively as a browser grows. The key is to avoid any disincentive for smaller browsers to expand their market share. Their revenue should increase as their user base grows, not decrease due to a hard threshold. This can be achieved with a tapered formula that gradually reduces the allowable default share Google can purchase, while ensuring that increased market share always results in increased revenue.
For the second concern, Google’s ability to pursue aggregate deals could be limited by enforcing a strict overall cap, e.g., prohibiting it from purchasing more than 50% of total browser defaults. This should be coupled with a ban on bundling or coercive agreements through arrangements like MADA or OEM partnerships that artificially steer distribution.
There are, of course, numerous implementation details to be considered. But the core idea is straightforward: it’s possible to design clear, practical mechanisms that protect the viability of smaller browsers without undermining the broader goals of the DOJ’s remedies.
If Mozilla Gets to Keep Their Deal, Then Should Apple?
No, in our opinion this deal offers very limited benefit, suppresses rather than promotes competition in the adjacent browser market, is substantial in scale, and appears poised to be highly effective in maintaining Google's dominance. Canceling this deal by our estimate will reduce Google’s U.S. search market share by approximately 21.8% to 30.2%, potentially single-handedly reducing Google’s United States market share to below 60%.
You can read our far more detailed arguments on why the DOJ is right to seek to cancel the Apple-Google search deal and prohibit any such future deals between Apple and Google.
Do We Really Want a World in Which Mozilla No Longer Exists?
It is true that Mozilla’s management has made missteps, as any long running organization might. However, it is equally true that anti-competitive practices by both Apple and Google, have made it nearly impossible for Mozilla to gain meaningful share in the mobile market. This has limited its ability to generate revenue and denied it the room to recover from mistakes that larger companies can more easily absorb.
The real question for readers is not whether Mozilla is perfect. It is:
Do you truly believe the web would be better off in a world where Mozilla no longer exists?
For more on this topic, please check out our far more detailed paper on the DOJ vs Google case that we published last week.